Pricing a Low-regret Seller
نویسندگان
چکیده
As the number of ad exchanges has grown, publishers have turned to low regret learning algorithms to decide which exchange offers the best price for their inventory. This in turn opens the following question for the exchange: how to set prices to attract as many sellers as possible and maximize revenue. In this work we formulate this precisely as a learning problem, and present algorithms showing that by simply knowing that the counterparty is using a low regret algorithm is enough for the exchange to have its own low regret learning algorithm to find the optimal price.
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Pricing Under a General Parametric Choice Model
We consider a stylized dynamic pricing model in which a monopolist prices a product to a sequence of T customers, who independently make purchasing decisions based on the price offered according to a general parametric choice model. The parameters of the model are unknown to the seller, whose objective is to determine a pricing policy that minimizes the regret, which is the expected difference ...
متن کاملMulti-attribute Regret-based Dynamic Pricing
In this paper, we consider the problem of dynamic pricing by a set of competing sellers in an information economy where buyers differentiate products along multiple attributes, and buyer preferences can change temporally. Previous research in this area has either focused on dynamic pricing along a limited number of (e.g. binary) attributes, or, assumes that each seller has access to private inf...
متن کاملDynamic Pricing under a Logit Choice Model
We consider a stylized dynamic pricing model in which a monopolist prices a product to a sequence of customers, who independently make purchasing decisions based on the price offered according to a logit choice model. The parameters of the logit model are unknown to the seller, whose objective is to determine a pricing policy that minimizes the regret, which is the expected difference between t...
متن کاملRobust monopoly pricing
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) mi...
متن کاملHorizon-Independent Optimal Pricing in Repeated Auctions with Truthful and Strategic Buyers
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a (truthful or strategic) buyer that holds a fixed valuation. We focus on a practical situation in which the seller does not know in advance the number of played rounds (the time horizon) and has thus to use a horizon-independent pricing. First, we consider straightforward modifica...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016