Using Idioms to Implicitly Invoke Analogical Framing in Decision Making

We often use analogies in strategic discourse to invite inferences about ambiguous situations that reinforce our own construal of these situations. By providing presumptive analogs, we control how audiences define and categorize these situations (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1992). For example, in the short-lived political debate preceding the American invasions of Iraq, supporters of U.S. involvement likened the conflicts to WW II and opponents called attention to their similarities with the Vietnam War (Spellman, Ullmann, & Holyoak, 1993). Several years earlier, Gilovich (1981) found that political science students were more likely to recommend intervention in a hypothetical foreign policy crisis when irrelevant features of the scenario (e.g., the name of the building used for press briefings) called to mind WW II (Winston Churchill Hall) rather than Vietnam (e.g., Dean Rusk Hall). The presence of these cues did not, however, lead students to judge the scenario as being more similar to one of the previous conflicts than the other. Subsequent research has confirmed that seemingly trivial cues can compel people to unwittingly employ analogies in their judgments and decisions (Spellman et al., 1993; Shimko, 1994; Stapel & Spears, 1996).