Ex Post Evaluation of Tradable Permits:
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DIVISION OF ECONOMICS STIRLING MANAGEMENT SCHOOL The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits
The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select a level of aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits (rent) to speci c groups. In most circumstances, these decisions are often politically contentious and frequently inuenced by rent seeking behaviour. In this paper, we use a contest model to analyse the e¤ects of rent seeking e¤ort when permit...
متن کاملThe Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits
The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select a level of aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits to specific groups. Both these decisions create opportunities for rent seeking. In this paper, we use a contest model to analyse the incentives to rent seek for pollution permits and to analyse the consequences for social welfare. We find diffe...
متن کاملPrices vs. Quantities: Ex-Post Efficiency through Open Market Operations in Permit Markets
In this paper, we show that a price-regulated market for tradable permits improves upon an unregulated market and upon an emission tax, when there is uncertainty about abatement costs. We derive a scheme of open market operations that allows to achieve ex-post efficiency and analyze its effects on the expected profits of the regulated firms and the expected revenue of the regulator. For the cas...
متن کاملTradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping
In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed...
متن کاملTradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping
In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed...
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تاریخ انتشار 2003