Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar
نویسنده
چکیده
* Paul K. Davis is a senior principal researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor of policy analysis in the Pardee RAND Graduate School. His early studies were in the hard sciences and he received a Ph.D. in theoretical chemical physics at M.I.T. After working on strategic technology and systems analysis at the Institute for Defense Analyses, he joined the U.S. government to work on strategic arms limitation, which included a period with the U.S. delegation in Geneva. He then joined the Defense Department where he worked initially on strategic nuclear programs before becoming a senior executive directing analysis of defense strategy and programs for the Persian Gulf (and, later, other regions worldwide). Dr. Davis then moved to the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, where his research has been in strategic planning under deep uncertainty (primarily defense planning), decisionmaking theory, resource allocation, deterrence, and advanced methods of modeling and analysis. In recent years, his work has drawn on social science to inform analysis of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Dr. Davis teaches graduate courses in the Pardee RAND Graduate School where he emphasizes interdisciplinary work connecting analysis, the hard and soft sciences, planning, and modeling. Dr. Davis has served on numerous studies for the National Academy of Sciences, Defense Science Board, and other organizations. He reviews for or serves as associate editor on a number of academic journals.
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