Hannu Vartiainen ― Klaus Kultti Multilateral Non-cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space Aboa Centre for Economics Hannu Vartiainen ― Klaus Kultti Multilateral Non-cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space
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چکیده
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold. JEL Classification: C7, D7
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تاریخ انتشار 2007