Polite responses to polite requests.

Indirect requests vary in politeness, for example, Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is? is more polite than Shouldn't you tell me where Jordan Hall is? By one theory, the more the literal meaning of a request implies personal benefits for the listener, within reason, the more polite is the request. This prediction was confirmed in Experiment I. Responses to indirect requests also vary in politeness. For Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is?, the response Yes, I can — it's up the street is more polite than It's up the street. By an extension of that theory, the more attentive the responder is to all of the requester's meaning, the more polite is the response. This prediction was confirmed in Experiments 2, 3 and 4. From this evidence, we argued that people ordinarily compute both the literal and the indirect meanings of indirect requests. They must if they are to recognize when the speaker is and isn't being polite, and if they are to respond politely, impolitely, or even neutrally. Article: When people make requests, they tend to make them indirectly. They generally avoid imperatives like Tell me the time, which are direct requests, in preference for questions like Can you tell me the time? or assertions like I'm trying to find out what time it is, which are indirect requests. The curious thing about indirect requests is that they appear to have one meaning too many. Can you tell me the time?, as a request, has the indirect meaning "I request you to tell me the time". Yet it also possesses the literal meaning "I ask you whether you have the ability to tell me the time". If the speaker is merely requesting the time, why the extraneous question about ability? How does it figure in the listener's understanding of that request'? It was these two questions that prompted the present study. These questions suggest two general kinds of processes by which an indirect request might be understood. The first kind, which we will call idiomatic processes, creates one and only one meaning — the indirect meaning. Can you tell me the time?, used as a request, would be understood directly and solely as "Please tell me the time". At no point would the listener create and use the literal meaning "Do you have the ability to tell me the time?" The second kind of process, which we will call multiple-meaning processes, creates both the literal and the indirect meanings, though not necessarily one after the other. By this kind of process Can you tell me the time? would be understood as involving both a question ("Do you have the ability?")and a request ("Please tell me the time"). Each kind of process is needed in certain clear cases. An idiomatic process is probably required for How do you do?, which is a question indirectly used as a greeting. Although the historical vestiges of the literal question ("How are you?") are still present, the question no longer has any force; it isn't answered sensibly by Fine, thank you. On the other hand, a multiple-meaning process is probably required for the use of It's late, isn't it? to request the time. There seems to be no way of figuring out the request without knowing what the speaker meant literally. However, on the continuum from frozen idioms like How do you do? to novel requests like /t 's late, isn't it ? there are intermediate cases in which a sentence is conventionally used for an indirect purpose. For these, either kind of process might apply. For conventional indirect requests like Can you tell me the time?, which kind of process is used? Within linguistics, the earliest proposals by Sadock (1970) required an idiomatic process, but more recent ones, by Searle (1975) and Morgan (1978) for example, require a multiple-meaning process. Within psychology, Schweller (1978) and Gibbs (1979) have proposed idiomatic processes, but Clark & Lucy (1975) and Clark (1979) have proposed two different processes of' the multiple-meaning variety. Thus, there is an issue here to be resolved. The feature that makes the multiple-meaning processes distinctive is their assumption that literal meaning, plays a role in comprehension. But if it does, what is that role? For indirect requests, one answer has been offered by Lakoff (1973, 1977) and by Brown & Levinson (1978): The literal meaning is important in conveying politeness. As requests for the time, May I ask you what time it is? is ordinarily more polite than Won't you tell me what time it is? Since the two requests have the same indirect meaning, the reason must lie in their literal meanings. The literal meaning of the first, roughly "I request permission to ask you what time it is", presumes very little on the requestee and offers him the power to grant permission. The literal meaning of the second, roughly "I ask you if you do not intend to tell me what time it is", presumes a good deal on the requestee and expresses a not-so-hidden criticism. By this logic, conventional indirect requests get their politeness rather directly from the literal meanings. In a roundabout way, responses to indirect requests may get their politeness from the literal meanings too. When Ann asks Bob Can you tell me the time?, Bob might ordinarily respond with a single "move", it's six. But if he wanted to be especially polite, it is our intuition that he would add a first move, as in Yes, I can — it's six. Let us call Yes, I can the literal move, and it's six the indirect move. If we assume that Bob couldn't give the literal move without computing the literal meaning, then he must have taken in Ann's request by a multiplemeaning process. But are responses with both moves actually more polite, and if so, why? In this paper, then, we will investigate two issues jointly. The first is comprehension. Does literal meaning play a role in the understanding of indirect requests, and if so, what? The second issue is politeness: What makes some indirect requests, and some responses, more polite than others? In the first half of the paper, we will take up the politeness of indirect requests, and in the second half, the politeness of their responses. The politeness of indirect requests In a request and its response, two people coordinate an exchange of goods. For convenience, let us assume the requestor is a woman called A, and the requestee a man called B. In her turn, A requests B to do something for her, and in his turn, B commits himself, or refuses to commit himself, to do what she wanted. When she requests information, as in all the requests we will consider, B ordinarily gives the information instead of merely committing himself to give it. The problem with requests is that, on the surface, they are inequitable. While A benefits from the information she receives, it costs B some effort to give it to her. In Goffman's (1955, 1967) terms, requests threaten B's "face". For Goffman, face is the positive social value people claim for themselves. It consists of two particular wants — the want to be unimpeded, free from imposition by others, and the want to be approved of in certain respects. People ordinarily act to maintain or gain face and to avoid losing face. Clearly A's requests, by imposing on B, are potentially threatening to B's face. Brown and Levinson (1978), following up work by Lakoff (1973, 1977), have incorporated this idea in a general theory of politeness whose basic tenet is this: people are polite to the extent that they enhance, or lessen the threat to, another's face. In our case, A will be polite to the extent that she can reduce or eliminate the threat to B's face caused by her request. We will look at only a few of the linguistic devices by which A could reduce or eliminate the threat to B's face for example, Can you, or Couldn't you, or Will you tell me the time? These devices differ in how much they benefit or cost B. Ordinarily, if a device benefits B, it simultaneously costs A, although the benefit to B may not equal the cost to A. For simplicity, we will assume that the benefit or cost to B actually does equal the cost or benefit to A. So A will be polite to the extent that the linguistic device she selects benefits B or lowers the cost to B (at least within limits). The linguistic devices we have selected are ones in which A asks B a literal question answerable by yes or no, and by virtue of that question she requests from him a relatively slight piece of information. Example: Will you tell me who is coming to dinner tonight? From the literature on indirect requests (e.g., Gordon & Lakoff, 1971; Green, 1975; Heringer, 1972; Sadock, 1972, 1974; Searle, 1975), we selected the 18 types listed in Table 1. These requests vary from polite to impolite; some of them take a literal yes answer for compliance, and others take a no. We will use the first few words of each request as its abbreviation, like May I ask you? for May I ask you where Jordan Hall is? Since all 18 requests have the same indirect meaning, their differences lie in the literal meanings. Indeed, these requests can be ordered, on a priori intuitive grounds, for how much their literal meanings, if taken seriously, would benefit B or reduce the costs to B. Note that all of them have one cost in common. They impose on B by asking a question he must answer with yes or no. Otherwise, the requests can be sorted into six broad categories (see Gordon & Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1975), as shown in Table 1. These categories can be ordered approximately for their benefit to B. 1. Permission. With the literal meaning of May I ask you where Jordan Hall is? , A is offering B the authority to grant her permission to make her request. This is obviously a great benefit to B. He now has a higher status, or authority, than he had the moment before, and the status entitles him to give permission to A even to make a rather trivial request. Such a benefit makes this and the other two requests in this category particularly polite. 2. Imposition. With the literal meaning of Would you mind telling me where Jordan Hall is? , A is no longer offering B the full authority to permit her to ask him for the wanted information. Still, she is offering him the authority to say that her request imposes too much. This benefits B. A is thereby admitting that she is imposing on him, and the admission benefits B too. So Would you mind? should be relatively polite too, although not as polite as May I ask? and its kind. The authority to grant permission, on the face of it, benefits B more than the mere chance to say that the task is too imposing. 3. Ability. When A says Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is? , she is literally asking B to say whether or not he has the ability to tell her where Jordan Hall is. By giving him the opportunity to deny this ability, the question both benefits and costs B a little bit. It benefits him by allowing him to avoid the embarrassment of being asked a request he couldn't comply with. But it costs him a little by suggesting that he may not be competent to comply. Compared to May I ask? and Would you mind? with their great benefits to B, Can you tell me? should be less polite. In so far as the other three ability requests reflect the same rationale, they should be similar in politeness. We will take up this qualification later. 4. Memory. The literal meaning of Have I already asked you where Jordan Hall is? makes a subtle demand on B. It asks him whether or not he can remember whether A asked him earlier for the location of Jordan Hall. Most of the time he won't find this literal demand easy to fulfill, and anyway, why should he be expected to keep track of what he has told her when she is in as good a position to remember as he is? So this question, if anything, costs B something, which works against politeness. The same goes for the other three requests in this category, especially Do I know? These requests should be less polite, generally, than those of permission, imposition, or ability. 5. Commitment. With the literal meaning of Will you tell me where Jordan Hall is?, A is asking B whether or not he will commit himself to tell her the wanted information. Commitments, of course, are quite the opposite of per-missions. In commitments, B obligates himself to A to carry out an action. This gives her the authority later to demand the fulfillment of his obligation, and that puts him in a position inferior to her. This should cost B a great deal — probably as much as or more than the memory requests. If so, Will you tell me? and its kind should be less polite even than the memory requests. 6. Obligation. The last request, Shouldn't you tell me where Jordan Hall is?, should be the least polite of all. By using should, A is literally asking B whether or not he is under some obligation to tell her the wanted information. By using shouldn't, she further implies that B has failed in his obligation. Her request, then, costs B in two ways. It implies that he is obligated to tell her something; he has no choice in the matter. The obligation here is more severe than in the commitment requests. And it scolds him for already having failed in his duties. With such onerous costs to B, this request should be relatively impolite. As this discussion shows, the ways in which the literal meaning can be used to benefit and cost B involve many factors. The ordering of these six categories of requests is our best judgment of how these factors combine for a net amount of politeness. Yet three factors that cut across these six categories and lead to subsidiary predictions are conditionality, negativity, and strength. The difference between May I ask you? and Might I ask you? is one of conditionality. The subjunctive might ordinarily indicates that what is being said is conditional on something. For Might I ask?, Brown and Levinson (1978), among others, speculate that the implicit condition is if you please. If so, might should benefit B and increase the politeness of the request, since it makes explicit that B can do as he pleases. The same contrast is found between Can you tell me? and Could you tell me?, and between Will you tell me? and Would you tell me? In each case, the conditional request should be the more polite of the two. The second factor is negativity, the difference between can and can't and between will and won't. The literal question Can you tell me? doesn't express any opinion pro or con about what the answer is likely to be. Can't you tell me?, however, does (Bolinger, 1975, pp. 528-529). In some contexts, it indicates that A expects a yes answer, supposing that B really can tell her the information. This is the so-called conducive reading. In other contexts, it indicates that A supposes that B cannot tell her the information and what she is questioning is whether or not her supposition is correct. This is the so-called plain reading. Either interpretation should be costly to B. The first presumes on B since it indicates that A already knows what his answer will be. And the second expresses a negative opinion about B — he doesn't have the ability to tell her the wanted information. Similar arguments go through for Will you tell me? and Won't you tell me? In both pairs, the negative should lead to less politeness. The final factor is strength. Compare I will go and I want to go. Although they differ in other ways too, they differ in the strength of the implied desire to go. Will indicates an intention to go; want indicates a more positive desire. For A to ask B to want to tell her something is therefore to ask for a stronger commitment. Since that is more costly to B, Do you want to tell me? should be less polite than Will you tell me? Also, there is a difference in strength of imposition implied between Would you mind? and Would it be too much trouble? With the first, A doesn't suggest that her imposition on B is very great, whereas with the second, she does — it may be too much trouble. Since the second benefits B more than the first, it should be more polite. These predictions assume requests among peers who are acquainted but not intimate. Among other people, the same factors should come into play but with different consequences. It would be very odd for a general to ask a private May I ask you what time it is? That would put the general in an inferior position that is inconsistent with his rank. The literal meaning still benefits B. It is just that it is inappropriate for a general to defer to a private. This suggests that politeness, as defined by costs and benefits, can be studied somewhat independently of appropriateness, whether or not it is appropriate to be so polite, or impolite. In this paper we will avoid this complication and stick to politeness among acquainted but not intimate equals. 1