Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 1 Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony

Coulson’s (2001) analysis of humor as “frame-shifting” is extended to irony and compared to other current theories of humor and irony, including Giora’s (2003) graded salience model. It is argued that the effects of humor and irony often depend on a subversive relationship between the initial and alternative frames, which adds to both cognitive and social meaning; understanding these effects requires consideration of the expansion of common ground (Clark, 1996) and relevance effects (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) triggered by the shift from a culturally licensed to a subversive frame. Reanalysis of several examples from recent studies in the light of these approaches shows that humor and irony, like other forms of figurative language, can serve complex communicative, social, and cognitive objectives that justify according them a central place in communication-oriented theories of language use. Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 3 Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) effectively “normalized” figurative language, moving theories of metaphor and metonym from the periphery to the center of theories of mind and communication. In this essay, I review some recent work on humor and irony and conclude that, like metaphor, they can generate extensive changes to cognitive environments for relatively little processing effort, leading to unexpected increments to relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Humor and irony often serve core communicative purposes in subtle and multifaceted ways that place them, alongside metaphor and metonymy, at or near the center of our theoretical attention. Reddy (1993) sensitized us to the importance of the “conduit” and “container” metatheoretical metaphors of communication; it is useful to extend the sense of his analysis to other meta-theoretical metaphors as well. For example, conceptual meta-metaphors such as “computation,” “inputs,” “storage,” “outputs,” and “mapping” perceptions and concepts from one “domain” to another, convey an implicit assumption that cognitive processes, including language, are “rational” in a sense akin to that of formal logic or the operations of a digital computer. It can be argued that the conventional treatment of forms such as humor and irony as exceptional and peripheral to “bona-fide” referential and propositional language uses (e.g., Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 2001; Raskin & Attardo, 1994) follow directly from these implicit rationalist assumptions. It is virtually impossible to avoid metaphorical language in theorizing about a process such as language use, but the entailments of a particular set of metaphors can sometimes be brought to the surface and neutralized through use of alternative metaphors with different Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 4 entailments (Reddy, 1993; Schön, 1993). The “framing” and “frame-shifting” metaphor (Coulson, 2001) usefully avoids many of the limiting assumptions of metaphors based on formal logic and computer modeling; it also connects with familiar concepts such as schemata and scripts, and thus with a large body of previous research in humor, irony, metonymy, and metaphor. Coulson presents the “frame-shifting” model in the context of Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; 2002), but the “frame-shifting” approach is to be preferred on several grounds. First, as a meta-theoretical metaphor, “frame-shifting” is potentially less constraining than the metaphors of “conceptual space” and “blending,” and avoids the multiplication of “spaces” implied by entailments of the ”space” and “blending” metaphors (Ritchie, 2004). “Frame-shifting” supports conceptual links to humor, metonymy, and other forms of figurative language, and affords a ready path for connecting the cognitive and neural levels of language to the social and cultural levels – assumed but never satisfactorily developed by Fauconnier and Turner. And finally, the “frame-shifting” approach helps to normalize humor and irony as routine forms of language use, just as Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) conceptual metaphor approach normalized metaphor. Frame-Shifting and Humor. Some of the most promising features of the “frame shifting” model are apparent in Coulson’s discussion of the quip, “By the time Mary had her fourteenth child, she’d finally run out of names to call her husband” (2001, p. 49). Coulson points out that the reader initially interprets “names” as a reference to baby names, an interpretation based on world knowledge about the procedures (including naming) typically associated with childbirth. Moreover, since world knowledge also includes the fact that fourteen is an atypically large Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 5 number of children, the idea that a mother might have a more difficult time thinking of a name for the fourteenth child than for the first or second child is also consistent with the standard child-bearing schema. However, the insertion of “husband” where “baby” would be expected introduces an inconsistent element that prompts lexical reinterpretation of “names” as “epithets.” This shift in interpretation activates extensive (and previously suppressed) knowledge of events surrounding childbirth, including the pain and discomfort associated with giving birth, the subsequent hard work associated with caring for an additional child, and the husband’s role in the pregnancy. The “fourteenth child” quip usefully illustrates basic processes in humor and irony. More importantly for the present purposes, it also illustrates how humor, irony, and other figurative communication forms can serve both social and cognitive purposes in communication. Humor Theories. Most extant theories of jokes, and of humor in general, rely on one or more of three explanatory mechanisms: aggression, incongruity, and arousal-safety. Each of these approaches explains some important aspects of humor, but none seems complete on its own. Aggression-based theories (e.g. Freud, 1960; Zillmann & Cantor, 1976) start with the premise that jokes constitute an attack by the joke teller upon the target of the joke, sometimes an individual but often a group. The aggression approach gains credibility from the persistent popularity of jokes that play on stereotypes about particular ethnic and religious groups, women, and other social categories, often focusing on lower-status and powerless groups. For example, consider the typical “light bulb” joke, analyzed in detail by Attardo (2001): “How many Polacks does it take to screw in a light bulb? Five, one to hold Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 6 the bulb and four to turn the chair.” This joke is readily interpreted as an insinuation that members of the target group, Polacks, are stupid and prone to doing things in the most difficult way possible, and consequently as an attack on members of that group. Many other racial, ethnic, and gender-based jokes have the same quality of aggressively insulting and disparaging innuendo. Jokes of this nature often serve the dual purpose of excluding the target group and enhancing the social solidarity of the joke teller and audience (Attardo, 2001; Norrick, 2003). In Zillmann and Cantor’s (1976) model, the appreciation of a joke of this nature depends crucially on the degree of the hearer’s animosity toward the target. However, extension of the aggression analysis to absurdist jokes such as “knockknock” and “elephant” jokes requires considerable theoretical contortion. Consider, “How can you tell if there is an elephant in your bathtub? By the smell of peanuts on its breath.” One might argue that these jokes somehow constitute an “aggression” against the hearer, but the word “aggression” would have to be understood in a metaphorical sense. Similarly, in the “fourteenth child” joke, calling the husband names (epithets) may be considered a form of symbolic aggression on Mary’s part, but that happens within the fictional layer of the joke, and it is less obvious how the joke qualifies as aggression on the part of a person who tells or appreciates the joke, unless the aggression is against the institution of maternity, taken as an “ideological target” (Attardo, 2001). But again, it is hard to interpret an action directed at an “ideological target” as “aggression’ except metaphorically. Even when an aggressive element is clearly present, the social “meaning” of the joke is often to be found at a deeper level. Consider the joke with which Giora (2003, p. 175) closes her chapter on humor: Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 7 “A bus stops and two Italian men get on. They sit down and engage in an animated conversation. The lady sitting behind them ignores them at first, but her attention is galvanized when she hears one of the men say the following: “Emma come first. Den I come. Den two asses come together. I come oncea-more. Two asses, they come together again. I come again and pee twice. Den I come one lasta time.” “You foul-mouthed swine,” retorted the lady indignantly. “In this country we don’t talk about our sex lives in public.” “Hey, coola down lady,” said the man. “Who talkin’ about a sexa? I’m a justa tellin’ my frienda how to spella ‘Mississippi’.” In the beginning, the “Mississippi” joke seems to turn on a familiar kind of symbolic “aggression” against Italian-Americans (or immigrants in general) as the butt of the joke, but the punch-line turns the tables, so the accusatory lady becomes the butt of the joke. On a surface level, since she is made to look foolish and “dirty-minded,” the joke does seem to qualify as aggression. But the deeper criticism is against anti-immigrant stereotypes, and people who react on the basis of incomplete information. Criticizing bigoted attitudes hardly seems aggressive, except, again, in a metaphorical sense. Consistent with the arousal-safety approach (Yus, 2003), the humor in the joke seems to flow more from defusing or even negating the implicit anti-immigrant aggression than from the aggression itself. The “Mississippi” joke invokes a double frame shift. It begins by playing on a familiar joke script (Attardo, 2001), in which the polite fictions by which people are expected to ignore sexuality and other bodily functions are undermined by children, immigrants, or other supposedly “under-socialized” persons. Then the punch-line reverses the field and Frame-Shifting in Humor and Irony 8/12/2006 8 undermines this conventional frame with a more fundamentally subversive frame that carries a deeper message that undermines and opposes the apparent bigotry of the original joke script. The “elephant” joke also involve a kind of subversive double frame shift. The opening question itself (“How do you know if there is an elephant in your bathtub?”) juxtaposes a realistic frame, in which an elephant could not possibly be found anywhere near my bathtub, with a fantasy frame in which an elephant might be a reasonable item to find in my bathtub, in a way that playfully subverts physical rather than social reality. Then the punchline reinforces the fantasy frame, even as it undermines it with a logically subversive frame, in which none of the obvious attributes of elephants (e.g., size and color) is deemed relevant, and the salience of a totally secondary association with eating peanuts is increased. The “lightbulb” and “Mississippi” jokes can be explained by an incongruity approach. In each case, the text of the joke is compatible with two distinct frames, which are in some sense opposite (Raskin, 1985). These jokes also seem to satisfy Raskin’s requirement of “a certain degree of playfulness,” although it is easy to imagine a non-playful communicative context in which either joke might appear; for example jokes of the “lightbulb” type often appear in conversational contexts critical of immigrants or other minorities. Conversely, the “Mississippi” anecdote might be offered as a pointed rejoinder to a series of tasteless anti-