Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements Part one

نویسنده

  • Dritan Osmani
چکیده

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The farsighted stability captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when ∗Corresponding author: Research Unit Attainability and Global Change, Hamburg University and Center for Atmospheric Science, Bundesstrasse 55 (Pavillion Room 31), 20146 Hamburg, Germany +49 40 42838 6597 (voice) +49 40 42838 7009 (fax) [email protected]

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تاریخ انتشار 2008