Exploitation and Safety in General Sum Games
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چکیده
We describe a method for an agent playing a generalsum normal form game to balance the rewards of exploiting a prediction of opponent behavior with the risks of being exploited by a self-interested opponent while guaranteeing a worst-case safety margin. Our algorithm, Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety, calculates a probability distribution over the agent’s moves that balances those concerns. The probability distribution is generated by finding a modification of the Stackelberg response in a modified game which reflects the assumption that the opponent will behave according to the prediction with some probability, but may best-respond. We prove that the tradeoff provided by a Restricted Stackelberg Response between taking advantage of a prediction and avoiding exploitation can be computed. We show experimental results using Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety in a generalsum game.
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