Free Choice in Deontic Inquisitive Semantics (DIS)

We will propose a novel solution to the free choice puzzle that is driven by empirical data from legal discourse and does not suffer from the same problems as implicature-based accounts. We will argue against implicature-based accounts and provide an entailment-based solution. Following Anderson’s violation-based deontic logic, we will demonstrate that a support-based radical inquisitive semantics will correctly model both the free choice effect and the boolean standard entailment relations in downward entailing contexts. An inquisitive semantics is especially suited to model sluicing effects where the continuation “but I do not know which” coerces an ignorance reading. It also demonstrates that the counterarguments to deontic reduction failed to take into account the different effects of inquisitive and informative utterances in conversation, such that a refined definition of radical inquisitive entailment renders such inferences invalid. Furthermore, we will argue that the problem of strengthening the antecedent that is used as a counterargument against entailment-based accounts also fails under a refined notion of entailment.