Entropic Equilibria Selection of Stationary Extrema in Finite Populations

نویسندگان

  • Marc Harper
  • Dashiell Fryer
چکیده

We propose the entropy of random Markov trajectories originating and terminating at a state as a measure of the stability of a state of a Markov process. These entropies can be computed in terms of the entropy rates and stationary distributions of Markov processes. We apply this definition of stability to local maxima and minima of the stationary distribution of the Moran process with mutation and show that variations in population size, mutation rate, and strength of selection all affect the stability of the stationary extrema.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015