A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
نویسنده
چکیده
This note demonstrates that a lattice game with strategic substitutes is dominancesolvable if and only if there exists a unique fixed point of the function that results from an iteration of the best response function. This finding complements a result of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990) by which a lattice game with strategic complements is dominance-solvable if and only if there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our main result by an application to a model of Cournot outcomecompetition.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 36 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007