Voting for a Lottery

Winning probabilities in a pairwise lottery system with three alternatives

The pairwise lottery system is amultiple round voting procedure which chooses by lot a winner from a pair of alternatives to advance to the next round where in each round the odds of selection are based on each alternative’s majority rule votes. We develop a framework for determining the asymptotic relative likelihood of the lottery selecting in the final round the Borda winner, Condorcet winne...

Are Voting and Buying Behavior Consistent? An Examination of the South Carolina Education Lottery

This article uses voting and sales data from the South Carolina Education Lottery to test whether the vote for a new lottery is driven by latent demand for lottery products or whether it reflects free-riding behavior or other public finance considerations. Including the predicted component of the lottery vote adds no explanatory power to a lottery sales regression. Given the dissimilarity of co...

Probabilistic Borda rule voting

An alternative voting system, referred to as probabilistic Borda rule, is developed and analyzed. The winning alternative under this system is chosen by lottery where the weights are determined from each alternative’s Borda score relative to all Borda points possible. Advantages of the lottery include the elimination of strategic voting on the set of alternatives under consideration and breakin...

The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox

List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence

Towards Secure Quadratic Voting

We provide an overview of some of the security issues involved in securely implementing Lalley and Weyl’s “Quadratic Voting” [37], and suggest some possible implementation architectures. Our proposals blend “end-to-end verifiable” voting methods with anonymous payments. We also consider new refund rules for quadratic voting, such as a “lottery” method.

Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting