Future of Turkey–EU relations: a civilisational discourse

Should or can Turkey join the European Union (EU)? This paper argues that there are three alternative scenarios of the EU decision to grant membership to Turkey: ‘privileged relationship offer,’ ‘wait and see attitude,’ and ‘start of full membership negotiations.’ It then gauges each alternative path, and argues that the most likely scenario is a decision to start the negotiations, followed by the scenario of ‘wait and see.’ The EU decision will be conditioned by its future vision of global governance and the role foreseen for Turkey inside, outside or at the margin of it. The paper concludes that the EU decision will have significant implications for the future of relations between Europe and Turkey on the one hand, and Europe and the Islamic world on the other. q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Turkey–EU relations: an overview Turkey’s close relations with the EU date back to the Association Agreement signed in Ankara in 1963 between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC). When the agreement was signed, Walter Hallstein, the President of the EEC Commission, declared “Turkey is part of Europe.” There were no noticeable objections to Hallstein’s statement; no one disputed his perception of where Turkey stood with respect to Europe and Europeanness. The common understanding at the time was that Turkey was an invaluable partner in Western security against the Soviet bloc and therefore must be integrated in the Western system as tightly as possible via, among others, the EEC mechanisms [33]. Less than three decades later, as the Cold War came to an abrupt end in 1989, the EU authorities re-assessed and downgraded the relative ‘value’ of Turkey for Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures 0016-3287/$ see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2004.07.008 E-mail address: [email protected]. A. Tekin / Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 288 Europe from central to secondary importance, relegating Turkey to the margins of the ‘new,’ ‘united’ Europe. Notwithstanding the culmination of the stipulations of the Ankara Agreement into a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey in 1995, Turkey’s bid for full membership in 1987 fell on deaf ears in the EU and political relations were poisoned for a number of reasons, including the human rights predicament of Turkey, in the course of the following decade. In the aftermath of the terrorist events on September 11, the EU felt an urgent need to reconsider its place in the new global security environment. As part of this reevaluation, the EU began to view its state of affairs with Turkey in a new light. After plainly excluding Turkey from its future enlargement plans at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU leaders rather surprisingly welcomed the 12-year old Turkish bid to be accepted as a candidate for full membership at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The summit decision gave signals of European rediscovery of Turkey’s indispensable role for the European security—just as the Association Agreement did so in 1963. The decision stipulated that Turkey would start the membership negotiations with the EU once the former completed its domestic reforms to satisfy the political requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria—stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Despite this positive decision of the 1999 Helsinki Summit, however, the European debate on ‘(re)locating’ Turkey with respect to Europe—geographically, economically, politically, and civilisationally—has not been finalized. The opposition to the Turkish entry has been quite noteworthy since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, especially for its fast evolving trajectory. The European objection initially focused on patchy human rights record of Turkey and the existence of death penalty. As Turkey made major improvements in this important issue area, the opposition shifted towards Turkey’s problematic democracy including cultural and minority rights, civilian control of the military, and lack of transparency of the state institutions. Again, Turkey responded with swift reforms to the satisfaction of the European demands. Various legislative packages containing sweeping reform measures were enacted into law. The focus of the European criticism then shifted to the issue of full implementation of the enacted laws. The Turkish government has shown its determination to improve the implementation. Yet, the opposition to Turkey has continued on the basis of the Cyprus issue. The recent referendum results and the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly accepting the UN-brokered Annan Plan in contrast to the Greek Cypriot rejection, boosted the position of the Turkish side in the eyes of the EU. Despite relentless Turkish efforts to conform to the EU’s political standards since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, there are still influencial quarters in the EU that persistently keep alive the fundamental claim of ‘civilisational incompatibility’ between the EU and Turkey. It must be noted that the opposition to Turkish entry has stemmed from very diverse reasons and therefore as Turkey has moved towards the EU standards of democracy and foreign relations, a number of opponents switched their initial positions. However, strong opposition can be expected from those who are likely to stick to their position regardless of the changes in Turkey since A. Tekin / Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 289 their ‘civilisational incompatibility’ argument is not conducive to reaching a consensus. Amidst this public discourse, the EU will deliver a verdict, in December 2004, on the future shape of its relations with Turkey. On the basis of the European debate on Turkey, this paper discerns three alternative scenarios about the EU decision this coming December: ‘privileged relationship offer,’ ‘wait and see attitude,’ and ‘start of full membership negotiations.’ The paper then assesses each alternative path and argues that the most likely scenario is a decision to start the negotiations, followed by the scenario of ‘wait and see,’ whereas a rejection of the Turkish bid is the least likely option. Before analyzing the three different scenarios, Section 2 gives a brief sketch of the fundamentals of the EU’s future vision. 2. A sketch of EU’s civilisational project The 2001 Laeken Summit’s Declaration on the Future of the European Union (EU) states that Europe is at a crossroads. Based on this understanding, the EU leaders decided at the Summit to ask for a European Convention to draw up proposals on three subjects: how to bring citizens closer to the European design and European institutions; how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union; and how to develop Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new world order. The Declaration further elaborated on the future vision of the EU: 1 For Aylin G The Union faces twin challenges, one within and the other beyond its borders. Within the Union, the European instutions must be brought closer to its citizens. . Beyond its border, in turn, the EU is confronted with a fast-changing, globalised world. Following the fall of the Berlin wall, it looked briefly as though we would for a long while living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights. . The eleventh of September has brought a rude awakening. . Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. . The image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens’ wishes. [Citizens] want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world. The ideas ingrained in the Laeken Declaration are not necessarily novel. Indeed, in important speeches before and after the Laeken Summit, the major statesmen of the EU offered opinions paralleling those of the Declaration on the Future of Europe [5,11,12]. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, submitted to the European a range of variables, including ‘identity issues,’ that are likely to influence Turkey–EU relations, see üney [13]. A. Tekin / Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 290 Council by the European Convention in 2003, also attest to the elements of Europe’s future vision. It can be summarised that the EU efforts are underway to: (1) create a European demos on the basis of common European values, (2) work more assertively for a morality and rule-based global system of governance, and (3) contribute to civilisational harmony. Clearly, the EU is searching for ways to develop a European demos that is expected to have a special European identity based upon shared European values and a common approach to universal issues [28:7]. The new European demos must be able to move beyond the national attachments of the member state citizens. Habermas identifies five attributes common to Europeans: “The neutrality of authority, embodied in the separation of church and state, trust in politics rather than the capitalist market, an ethos of solidarity in the fight for social justice, high esteem for international law and the rights of the individual and support for the organizational and leading role of the state” [15]. It is generally accepted that the EU wants to have a bigger and stronger say in global affairs. The EU aims to emerge as a global actor [20]. A global-power Europe needs on the one hand an optimal size and location in geography, population and resources, and on the other hand a relatively unified decision-making capacity to arrive at decisions as swiftly as the fast pace of global events require. Additionally, as a response to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU has increasingly emphasised going beyond real politik and called for the development of a ruleand value-based, inclusive global society [31]. A recent essay co-written by Habermas and Derrida, two leading philosophers of the continent, called upon the avant garde core of European states to design a common European foreign policy based on European enlightenment values. Responding to the American invasion of Iraq, Habermas and Derrida identified “high esteem for international law” among the five attributes Europeans share [15,42]. Finally, the ‘new’ European project, at least in rhetoric, envisions a plural global community based on sharing experiences among different civilisations on the basis of mutual respect, tolerance and solidarity. Especially after the September 11 attacks, the global community has belaboured the issue of dialogue among different cultural traditions, between the East and West. The EU has played an important role in bringing together representatives of various cultures in a variety of forums to promote peaceful, enlightened visions of cooperation. Such a forum was convened in Istanbul on 12–13 February 2002 with the participation of representatives of 76 countries, including 51 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, from the EU and Islamic countries [24]. This was the first ever high-level meeting devoted to the need to intensify multicultural dialogue, with the goal of, in Jordanian Prince El Hassan Bin Talal’s words, “providing the first opportunity to engage in conversation with each other, rather than talking at each other” [24:152]. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the European Council, stated “the developing culture in Europe encompasses all civilisations. We have, in the EU, millions of citizens or residents who recognise in themselves both the values of Europe and those of Islam” [24:35]. A. Tekin / Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 291 The joint forum discussed the issue of how to promote understanding and harmony among civilisations, and concluded that cultures, in their diversity, complement and enhance one another. The forum also confirmed its belief in the harmony among civilisations and its attainability” [24:259–60]. Based upon these EU ambitions, the EU has been in the process of assessing what Turkey’s entry into the Union may mean for its future scenario. Somewhat in simplified terms, this article suggests that there are several possible conclusions on the Turkish question coming out of such European assessments. It is suggested by some Europeans that the Turkish membership will harm much-needed common identity and solidarity among the peoples of Europe, while others argue that it will strengthen multicultural characteristics of the European demos and indicate its inclusiveness of people with different beliefs and persuasions. While some insist that Turkish entry means more trouble than benefits for European foreign policy, many others argue in favour of integrating Turkey into the EU especially as Turkey will provide the EU with significant ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ powers to further evolve into a global player. Finally, there is a sharp division between those who believe that the Turkish membership will be just another case of Western powers trying to manipulate the Islamic World through Turkey, and those who claim it will mean that the EU is a union based upon common values and principles, not upon Christianity, and thus the Turkish entry will constitute a solid refutation of the clash of civilizations scenario. Indeed, Europeans seem to be quite ‘torn’ about the Turkish membership, to borrow Huntington’s characterization of Turkey as a ‘torn’ country. The remainder of the paper analyses alternative views of how the Turkish membership may influence the realisation of the European vision of future in detail. 3. Turkey in Asia but as a bridge to Europe: special relationship model? The intellectual roots of the special relationship argument goes deep into the history of Turkey–Europe relations. However, the argument has been rejuvenated in the postCold War period. Huntington wrote early in the 1990s that “Turkey has the history, population, middle level of economic development, national coherence, and military tradition and competence to be the core state of Islam” [17:179]. He argues that Atatürk prevented the Turkish republic from playing the leadership role in the Islamic world the Ottomans once did, by explicitly defining Turkey as a secular society and thus ‘tearing’ Turkey [17:179]. Yet, Huntington believes that “at some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist of the West” [17:179]. Huntington also argues that “Islam is a source of instability in the world because it lacks a dominant center. States aspiring to be leaders of Islam, such as Turkey., compete for influence in the Muslim World; . no one of them is able to act authoritatively on behalf of Islam in dealing with conflicts between Muslim and nonMuslim groups” [17:265]. All in all, Huntington argues that Turkey shall turn back to its Islamic roots and perhaps lead the Islamic World vis-à-vis other civilizations A. Tekin / Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 292 including the Western civilization. Waever mentions Turkey, along with the EU and Russia, is to become one of Europe’s three new empires, leading Turkish-speaking former republics of the Soviet Union, and operating “as a centre of power between Brussels, Moscow and the Middle East” [43:238]. Although it is difficult to discern any direct linkage, Huntington’s more general arguments parallel those of the Europeans who propose a special relationship with Turkey short of full membership. The alternative has been popular in recent years especially among conservative politicians and scholars in Germany and France. The tenet of their argument is almost identical to that of Huntington’s: Turkey is so “irremediably different” from Europe that its inclusion in the Union would spell “the end of the EU.” Therefore, the argument goes, the EU must tell the Turks this unpleasant reality and start working on a special relationship framework applicable to other Southern and Eastern neighbours [35]. The following discussion details the rationalization of European conservatives’ position on the basis of a list of political, economic and cultural arguments against the Turkish membership. 3.1. Turkey as an obstacle to creating a European demos There are widely shared counter-arguments against the Turkish membership for its expected negative impact on the EU’s vision of creating a European demos. European history often points out to ‘the Turk’ as the ‘other’ with fundamental differences from the Europeans [16,26]. It is too hard to digest the cultural/religious traits of ‘the Turk’ within a common European identity. Indeed, Huntington mentions ‘the indigestibility of Muslims’ [17:265 and 305] in the West as a potential source of conflict on the basis of his assertion that ‘even more than Christianity, Islam is an absolutist faith’ and ‘it merges religion and politics’ [17:265]. These arguments against Turks are further accentuated by the proposition that they are too numerous to ‘absorb’ [9:134,34:98]. Furthermore, if the European demos is loosely, multiculturally constructed to accommodate the inclusion of Turks, such a construction may be ineffective in the face of strong nationalist challenges within the member countries. This too broadly-defined European identity would not help bridge the gap between the different nationalities, perhaps even leading to the deepening of the differences, and thus to an identity crisis within the EU. Hans-Gert Pöttering, the President of the Christian Democrats, currently the largest political party group in the European Parliament, recently lamented that “because of its significant cultural differences, Turkey’s inclusion in the EU would make the EU dysfunctional”[21]. Similarly, Buzan and Diez assert that “further integration between Turkey and the EU threatens the social and political self-identification of each to an unsustainable degree” [7:46]. It is suggested that Turkey has another side to its ‘personality’ that its modernizing elites have failed to transform, and are not eager to acknowledge. Today Turkey ranks 96th among 175 countries in terms of Human Development Index of the United Nations [42:237]. In Anatolia and strangely in many major cities of Western Europe, masses of Turkish people remain attached to tenets of the traditional society. Teitelbaum and Martin write that Turks in Germany “were the last guest workers to arrive in large numbers, the poorest, the least educated, and the most different in cultural and historical terms.” A. Tekin / Futures 37 (2005) 287–302 293 They further comment that “their integration was also impeded by sharp differences between Turkish and European cultural views on the roles of men and women, by the deep significance of Islam in the daily lives of many Turks” [34:105]. Many in Europe (and also in Turkey) question the compatibility of ‘radical versions’ of Islam with the values commonly espoused by the EU. Peoples Party of Denmark perhaps went the furthest when its newspaper advertisement for the coming European Parliament elections overtly proclaimed that “if there was free elections in Turkey, an Islamic regime (sheria law) would come” [6]. 3.2. Turkey as a civilisational outsider For some of the antagonists, there are basically two kinds of ‘irremediable’ problems of Turkish membership: cultural and geographical. They often refer to the European history depicting Turkey as ‘the other’ and conclude that there is an insurmountable civilisational discrepancy between Turkey and the EU. On the cultural discrepancy, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reiterated his well-known view that the ‘fundamental cultural differences’ with Turkey are of ‘decisive importance’[9:134]. Schmidt is not alone on his approach. For instance, in April 1990, Pope John Paul II in a speech in Prague reminded the continent of the Christian basis of its unity: “A united Europe is no longer only a dream. It is an actual process, which cannot be purely political or economic. It has profound cultural, spiritual and moral dimension. Christianity is at the very roots of European culture” [16:194]. Stephens mentions that “for many European politicians, Europe is not a geographical or political culture, but a modern reincarnation of the ancient Christianity” [10]. Heater writes that “Christianity has been not only an integrating factor, but a means also of differentiating Europe from Islam, initially as a creed, later as personified by the Turk. Little wonder that Turkey was excluded from most schemes for EU” [16:182]. Along the same lines, Öniş remarks that