[“Page Layout View” required for on-screen viewing of some figures and tables] [Figures 1-7 and 9-10 are found in separate Word files] Extension and Application of the Strategic Entry Model to Collusive Electoral Coalitions

Parties and candidates are generally expected to compete when given the chance, and to cooperate only when necessary. Theories of coalition and electoral behavior are built on the understanding that, so long as the polity is stable enough to stand it, parties and candidates strive for exclusive hold on elective office and unfettered execution of their own preferred policies. The notion that competition is natural is grounded in the justifiable economistic premise that political actors are strategic and jealous. But if economics is any guide, this premise should lead to expectations of anti-competition. Democratic theory has noted that party systems are closer to oligopoly than to perfectly competitive markets (Robertson 1976, MacPherson 1977, Ware 1979), and that this might allow collusion between parties (Stigler 1972, Miller 1983, Strom 1990, Wellhofer 1990, Strom 1992, Shefter 1994, Bartolini 1999 and 2000). Empirical and formal work that addresses parties’ strategic interdependence does acknowledge party systems’ oligopolistic properties, at least implicitly -but it then ignores the possibility of collusion in practice. I argue that strategic political actors tend to produce non-competitive outcomes -and that non-competition may reflect not only unilateral withdrawal by weaker actors, but also proactive collusion among actors weak and strong. Parties and candidates in “competitive” party systems always face incentives to be “lazy monopolists” and avoid the effort, risk, and responsibility that competition demands. Under certain conditions, these incentives will trump competitive ones and produce collusive outcomes in practice.