Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning

نویسندگان

  • John Realpe-Gomez
  • Bartosz Szczesny
  • Luca Dall'Asta
  • Tobias Galla
چکیده

John Realpe-Gomez, ∗ Bartosz Szczesny, 3, † Luca Dall’Asta, 4, ‡ and Tobias Galla § Politecnico di Torino, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy Theoretical Physics, School of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP), Strada Costiera 11, 34014 Trieste, Italy (Dated: January 11, 2013)

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1102.0876  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011