On Stable Solutions of the One - and Two - sided Model Matching Problems
نویسنده
چکیده
An algorithm is introduced to determine proper and stable solutions to the model matching problem. It utilizes the theory of inverses and state-space algorithms, and it guarantees a proper and stable solution to the problem when one exists. This approach is also used to determine proper and stable solutions of the two-sided matching problem. Examples are included.
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تاریخ انتشار 2009