Developing intuitions about free will between ages four and six.

نویسندگان

  • Tamar Kushnir
  • Alison Gopnik
  • Nadia Chernyak
  • Elizabeth Seiver
  • Henry M Wellman
چکیده

Our folk psychology includes intuitions about free will; we believe that our intentional acts are choices and that, when such actions are not constrained, we are free to act otherwise. In a series of five experiments, we ask children about their own and others' freedom of choice and about the physical and mental circumstances that place limitations on that freedom. We begin with three experiments establishing a basis for this understanding at age four. We find that 4-year-olds endorse their own and others' ability to "do otherwise" only when they or others are free to choose a course of action, but not when others' actions are physically impossible (Experiment 1), their own actions are physically constrained (Experiment 2), and their own actions are epistemically constrained (Experiment 3). We then examine developmental changes in children's understanding of actions and alternatives that lead to more adult-like free will intuitions. Across two experiments, 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, endorse another person's (Experiment 4) or their own (Experiment 5) freedom to act against stated desires. These age-related changes suggest relationships between a belief in free will and other cognitive and conceptual developments in theory of mind, self-control and self-awareness that take place in early childhood.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Cognition

دوره 138  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015