The Psychology of Moral Conviction

This paper reviews current theory and research that indicates that attitudes held with strong moral conviction (‘moral mandates’) represent something psychologically distinct from other constructs (e.g., attitude strength, partisanship, or religiosity), and that variance in moral conviction has important social and political consequences, such as increased intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others, difficulties in conflict resolution, increased political participation, willingness to accept violent means to achieve preferred ends, strong ties to positive and negative emotions, and inoculation against the usual pressures to obey authorities, obey the law, or to conform to majority group influence. The normative implications of these findings are both reassuring (moral convictions can protect against obedience to potentially malevolent authorities) and terrifying (moral convictions are associated with rejection of the rule of law, and can provide a motivational foundation for violent protest and acts of terrorism). Implications and directions for future research are discussed. The Psychology of Moral Conviction A common theme that cuts across many controversial issues of the day is that at least one side in each case defines its position in moral terms. Controversies such as abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, capital punishment, and health care reform each seem to have advocates and opponents who see these issues in terms of self-evident and fundamental truths about right and wrong. To support alternatives to what is ‘right,’ ‘moral’ and ‘good’ is to be absolutely ‘wrong,’ ‘immoral,’ if not evil (e.g., Black, 1994; Bowers, 1984; Mooney, 2001). Issues people see in a moral light are more likely to be closed to compromise and are especially tied to people’s motivations to become politically engaged to either proactively stand up for what they believe is right, or reactively fight against what they believe to be fundamentally wrong. For example, Norman Morrison immolated himself within sight of Robert McNamara’s window at the Pentagon in protest of the Vietnam War. His friend John Roemer explained Morrison’s behavior this way, ‘He fought the war more and more deeply...he played it out in his mind, I think, in terms of being a moral witness’ (DeRaymond, 2006). Other examples of people’s willingness to take a stand in the name of their beliefs exist as well, that range in scope from the non-violent sit-ins at lunch counters in the southern US to protest racial discrimination in service, turning to the streets to protest election outcomes in Iran, standing up to tanks in Tiananmen Square, displaying a bumper sticker to articulate one’s position on an issue of the day, to bombing a Federal building in Oklahoma City (e.g., Timothy McVeigh), assassinating abortion providers (the recent murder of Dr George Tiller in Kansas), flying airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, or bombing public transportation targets in London and Madrid. The recognition that some attitudes seem to be imbued with particular moral fervor and passion led to the development of a program of research designed to investigate whether there is in fact anything special about attitudes held with strong moral conviction Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/4 (2010): 267–281, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00254.x a 2010 The Author Journal Compilation a 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd that could not be explained by other well-known attitude constructs, such as attitude strength (e.g., attitude extremity, importance, or certainty). The answer to the question of whether measuring moral convictions brings something new to our ability to predict behavior has been a resounding ‘yes.’ The goal of this paper is to review (i) the theoretical framework that has been guiding this program of research, (ii) the measurement and construct validity of moral conviction, (iii) research that has tested hypotheses about moral conviction, and (iv) some of the many areas that are still ripe for future research. The Theoretical Foundations of Moral Conviction Attitudes consist of positive and negative evaluations of attitude objects (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), whereas moral convictions consist of evaluations based on perceptions of morality and immorality, right and wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Building on insights from theory and research on moral development, we have proposed that there are important distinctions between whether people’s attitudes reflect subjective preferences, normative conventions, or moral imperatives (e.g., Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 2002). Personal preferences are subject to individual discretion and are not socially regulated. For example, one family’s preference to vacation at the beach instead of the mountains is a matter of taste. Others’ preferences about the same object are not right or wrong; they are simply different. Conventions, in contrast, are socially or culturally shared notions about the way things are normally done in one’s group. Authorities, rules, and laws often formally sanction conventions. Although everyone within the group boundary is supposed to understand and adhere to matters of convention, people outside of the group boundary need not. Matters of moral imperative, however, generalize and apply regardless of group boundaries: right is right, and wrong is wrong (e.g., Turiel, 2002). There is individual variation, however, in the degree that people view the same attitude object as a preference, convention, or a moral imperative. Although many people seem to see the abortion issue in a moral light, for example, other people’s attitudes may reflect preferences or conventional beliefs or norms. For example, one woman may have a pro-choice position on abortion because she would prefer to have a last resort form of birth control. Another person might have a pro-choice position because it is currently legal in his state and country, but would think it was wrong if it were against the law; alternatively, he might support or oppose abortion because his neighbors do, but would change his mind if the opinion of the majority changed. Attitudes that reflect moral convictions (also referred to as ‘moral mandates,’ e.g., Mullen & Skitka, 2006a; Skitka & Mullen, 2002) theoretically differ from attitudes based more on preferences or normative conventions in a host of ways, which we have recently spelled out in an integrated theory of moral conviction (ITMC, Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008). For example, moral mandates are experienced as more objectively and universally true than preferences or conventions. Moral mandates also are inherently more motivating and self-justifying, are more autonomous, and have different and potentially stronger ties to affect than preferences or conventions, each of which have implications for the degree to which people, for example, are willing to tolerate differences of opinion. Each of these characteristics of moral conviction is explained in more detail below.