Strategic voting in large elections under proportional representation : Why vote for center parties ? ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
Most of the countries in the democratic world use proportional representation to allocate seats in parliaments. There are typically more than two serious parties in those countries. Consequently, the two-party competition models do not help us much to understand the political economy of those countries. When there are more than two parties, it is no longer rational for voters to vote for the party they prefer. For instance, if one’s preferred party has no chance of being part of the future government, it may be utility maximizing to vote for another party and help it join the government. Consequently, a complete picture of proportional representation requires to take account of strategic behaviour both by parties and by voters. Parties are strategic in their choice of the proposed platform, as well as in their choice of which other parties they will form a coalition with in case they have their say in the forming of the winning government. Voters are strategic at the voting stage, and their choice of which party to vote for will
منابع مشابه
Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation
How do polls influence strategic voting under proportional representation? This paper derives a strategic calculus of voting for coalitions that generates testable predictions about the effects of polls on strategic voting in elections involving four or more parties. Incentives of leftist voters to vote for a centrist over a noncentrist party are shown to increase with the difference in expecte...
متن کاملDo Polls InBuence the Vote?
PO L L S P ROV I D E I N F O R M AT I O N A B O U T how well the parties are doing in a campaign. That information may affect voters’ perceptions of the various parties’ chances of winning in a Arst past the post (FPP) system such as Canada or the chances of being part of a coalition government in a proportional representation (PR) system. By affecting voters’ expectations about the outcome of ...
متن کاملEXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION : THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE * Francesco
We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
متن کاملExtreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case
We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters’ preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
متن کاملParty Formation and Policy Outcomes under Di ff erent Electoral Systems ∗
I introduce a simple model of representative democracy that allows for strategic parties, strategic candidates, strategic voters, and multiple districts. If the distribution of policy preferences is not too heterogeneous across and within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under Proportional Representation than under Plurality Voting, confirming Duverger’s hypothesis, and...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010