A Set of Solutions to Parfit’s Problems

In Part Four of Reasons and Persons Derek Parfit searches for “Theory X,” a satisfactory account of well-being. Theories of well-being cover the utilitarian part of ethics but don’t claim to cover everything. They say nothing, for example, about rights or justice. Most of the theories Parfit considers remain neutral on what well-being consists in; his ingenious problems concern form rather than content. In the end, Parfit cannot find a theory that solves each of his problems. In this essay I propose a theory of well-being that may provide viable solutions. This theory is hedonic—couched in terms of pleasure—but solutions of the same form are available even if hedonic welfare is but one aspect of well-being. In Section 1, I lay out the “Quasi-Maximizing Theory” of hedonic well-being. I motivate the least intuitive part of the theory in Section 2. Then I consider Jesper Ryberg’s objection to a similar theory. In Sections 4-6 I show how the theory purports to solve Parfit’s problems. If my arguments succeed, then the Quasi-Maximizing Theory is one of the few viable candidates for Theory X.