Volitional Pragmatism

I seek here to develop the general outlines of a theory of environmental policy. It is a theory that will stand in stark contrast to the tendentious and normative welfare economics that now dominates the policy dialogue in applied economics. In this standard approach, economists place " …exclusive reliance on individual utilities to judge social goodness and right actions [Sen 1993, p. 521]. " The commitment to welfarism has become the basis for truth claims regarding definitions of the good and of the better thing to do. When public decision makers find sufficient reasons to ignore the policy prescriptions of applied economists they are often denounced for taking actions that are inefficient, politically motivated, irrational, and not in the public interest [Arrow, et al., We see here a conflict between the way applied economists believe public policy ought to be considered and implemented, and the way in which public policy is in fact considered and implemented. Who is right? Do applied economists bring abiding truth to public policy through the application of consequentialist welfarism? Are the truth claims of economists of sufficient authority and disciplinary legitimacy that they provide compelling reasons to alter the way democracies go about the business of collective decision making? The issue here concerns a debate over who shall define for the members of a particular political community what they ought to want, and what they 2 ought to do. 1 Common examples of truth claims from applied economists would include the following: Policy X should be pursued because it will thereby increase social welfare. Policy Y should not be pursued because its net present-valued benefits are negative. Policy Z is socially desirable because it can be shown that the gainers from that policy could compensate the losers from that policy (though of course actual compensation need not occur). Economic institutions will change when it is efficient for them to change. If it is not efficient for them to change then they will notand should notchange. These truth claims are both normative and tendentious. The question before us concerns the legitimacy of such claims. Notice that the matter of legitimacy has two components. The first component concerns the coherence of such truth claims judged by the standards of disciplinary practices from which they spring. That is, are these truth claims internally legitimate? The second component concerns the coherence of such truth claims judged by the standards …