Embedding Games

Large scale distributed computing infrastructures pose challenging resource management problems, which could be addressed by adopting one of two perspectives. On the one hand, the problem could be framed as a global optimization that aims to minimize some notion of system-wide (social) cost. On the other hand, the problem could be framed in a game-theoretic setting whereby rational, selfish users compete for a share of the resources so as to maximize their private utilities with little or no regard for system-wide objectives. This game-theoretic setting is particularly applicable to emerging cloud and grid environments, testbed platforms, and many networking applications. This thesis considers both perspectives. By adopting the first, global optimization perspective, this thesis presents netEmbed: a framework, associated mechanisms, and implementations that enable the mapping of requested configurations to available infrastructure resources. By adopting the second, game-theoretic perspective, this thesis defines and establishes the premises of two resource acquisition mechanisms: “Colocation Games” and “Trade and Cap”. Colocation Games enable the modeling and analysis of the dynamics that result when rational, selfish parties interact in an attempt to minimize