SafeDeflate: compression without leaking secrets

The Cost of Comparing Secrets without Leaking Information

Gruppen secret sharing, or, how to share several secrets if you must?

Each member of an n-person team has a secret, say a password. The k out of n gruppen secret sharing requires that any group of k members should be able to recover the secrets of the other n−k members, while any group of k−1 or less members should have no information on the secret of other team member even if other secrets leak out. We prove that when all secrets are chosen independently and hav...

New Protocols for Proving Knowledge of Arbitrary Secrets While not Giving Them Away

This paper introduces and describes new protocols for proving knowledge of secrets without giving them away: if the verifier does not know the secret, he does not learn it. Three role configurations exist for this type of protocols: (1) the prover may want to pro-actively prove knowledge of a secret, (2) a verifier may ask someone to prove knowledge of a secret, or (3) two players may mutually ...

A secure and privacy-preserving event reporting scheme for vehicular Ad Hoc networks

In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), vehicles should report events to warn the drivers of unexpected hazards on the roads. While these reports can contribute to safer driving, VANETs suffer from various security threats; a major one is Sybil attacks. In these attacks, an individual attacker can pretend as several vehicles that report a false event. In this paper, we propose a secure event-rep...

Protecting Encrypted Cookies from Compression Side-Channel Attacks

Compression is desirable for network applications as it saves bandwidth; however, when data is compressed before being encrypted, the amount of compression leaks information about the amount of redundancy in the plaintext. This side channel has led to successful CRIME and BREACH attacks on web traffic protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The general guidance in light of the...