Discounted Stochastic Games
نویسنده
چکیده
We give an alternative proof to a result of Mertens and Parthasarathy, stating that every n-player discounted stochastic game with general setup, and with a norm-continuous transition, has a subgame perfect equilibrium. † Institute of Mathematics and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel. e-mail: [email protected] This paper is part of the Master thesis of the author done with Prof. Ehud Lehrer in Tel Aviv University. I would like to thank Prof. Lehrer for many discussions and ideas and for the continuous help he offered. My gratitude is also given to Abraham Neyman, Sergiu Hart and J.F. Mertens for the discussions we had on the subject. I deeply thank the associate editor and two anonymous referees for many comments which substantially improved the paper.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Oper. Res.
دوره 23 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1998