An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions

نویسندگان

  • Jinho Choi
  • Gyoo Gun Lim
  • Kun Chang Lee
چکیده

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse emarketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Artificial Societies and Social Simulation

دوره 13  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010