The Strategy and Tactics of Information Warfare

Over the last decade, information technology has been championed by policymakers, activists, international bureaucrats, business leaders and intellectuals as a catalyst for social transformation-generating economic growth and development, peace and global cosmopolitanism, personal freedom and individual empowerment. Like the industrial revolution before it, the information technology revolution appears to be creating a new ruling class, a new economy and a new society. It should come as no surprise that strategic thinkers and security experts have become enamoured with the ways that information technology can transform military operations and warfare. Information technology, military leaders and intellectuals argue, can supplant the Clausewitzian industrial-era model of destructive war with an information-era model promising greater efficiency and flexibility, and fewer risks of casualties through the use of more highly skilled troops and 'smart' technologies. Just as the nuclear age elevated the logic of deterrence over destruction, in the information age, the logic of disruption has the potential to rival the logic of destruction. For these reasons, the information age in warfare represents a significant disjuncture with the past. Information technology, however, has always been central to warfare and crucial for enhancing military effectiveness. The establishment of a telegraph network considerably influenced the conduct of military operations and enhanced the effectiveness of military forces during the American Civil War and Wars of German Unification.' The introduction of wireless around the turn of the twentieth century represented an important aspect of the naval revolution that many associated with the development of the all-big gun battleships powered by turbine engines, and the development of extended-range submarines and torpedoes. The wireless was also a means of providing greatly enhanced strategic warning. During the interwar period, the rapid