On Transparency and Accountability: Evidence from an Asymmetric Public Good Game

Transparency and accountability are often regarded as crucial for good governance and the efficient organization of public affairs. To systematically explore the impact of transparency and accountability on cooperation, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments on a variation of the public good game with asymmetric agents. While (standard) agents may only contribute to the public good, some (special) agents do not only have the option to contribute to the public good, but may also deteriorate it to their own advantage. In the absence of a sanction mechanism, transparency backfires: special agents extract significantly more resources for higher transparency, while standard agents delink their contributions from the special agents’ actions. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism, even a low degree of transparency sustains contributions to the public good: low transparency creates accountability of special agents for deterioration of the public good, since stigmatization allows standard agents to punish make them for noncooperation. Finally, high transparency establishes higher contributions of standard agents, as it allows targeted punishment, thereby creating accountability of non-cooperative special agents and standard agents.