Editorial: Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Economic Games

In this Research Topic, a collection of research and review articles contribute to our understanding of the factors influencing human prosocial and antisocial behavior in economic games. Under the labels of " prosocial " and " antisocial " behavior we consider all those actions that help or hurt others, respectively. While the prosocial, bright side of human behavior has received much attention in more than two decades, its antisocial, dark side is far less studied. This Research Topic aims to combine both sides into a comprehensive account of human social behavior. The games that are used in the different studies are typically derivations of well-known and much studied setups such as the Public Goods, Ultimatum, Trust and Dictator Games, all invented in the 80's and 90's. However, many of our discussed articles include new measures and techniques from biology and neuroscience (e.g., digit ratio, fMRI, skin conductance) or psychology (e.g., cognitive reflection, self-control, meditation) which in the first decades of the study of social behavior using economic games were alien to economists. This could only happen through a strong and fruitful interaction between economists, psychologists, biologists and neuroscientists in the past 15 years. Several articles in the Research Topic have focused primarily on prosocial behaviors discussing concepts like altruism, cooperation, fairness and efficiency (typically in opposition to pure self-interest). These include Others have also added analyses or discussions about antisocial behaviors, introducing notions such as punishment, envy, spite or intergroup competition. These include Chen and Perc, McCall One particularly prominent strand of this research has studied the cognitive basis of prosocial and antisocial behaviors building on the distinction between automatic/intuitive and controlled/deliberative cognitive processes (i.e., from a dual-process perspective). Rand and Kraft-Todd find that individuals cooperate more in a one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG) when they are forced to decide quickly, which prompts intuitive decision-making, compared to a " deliberative " condition where they are forced to delay their choices. In addition to this result, which corroborates previous findings (e.g., Rand et al., 2012, 2014), they find that when the payoff structure of the PGG is manipulated in such a way that cooperation is payoff-maximizing, the effect of intuition vs. deliberation no longer exists. These findings are in line with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis developed in Rand et al. (2014), which states that humans internalize social behaviors that are beneficial in real-life long-run interactions and apply them intuitively to one-shot