Electoral Competition and Partisan Policy Feedbacks∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We study dynamic electoral competition with partisan policy feedbacks (a situation in which a policy systematically affects the electorate’s future political preferences) in a public finance environment. Two parties with diverging preferences over redistribution choose socially undesirable levels of public employment because employment status systematically affects a citizen’s beliefs about redistribution. We provide an explicit microfoundation for this dynamic linkage, and investigate main determinants of the resulting distortions.
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تاریخ انتشار 2013