Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

نویسندگان

  • Christian W. Bach
  • Elias Tsakas
چکیده

Article history: Received 29 March 2013 Available online 10 February 2014 JEL classification: C72 D83 D85

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 85  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2014