Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.
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تاریخ انتشار 2003