Using Incentives to Obtain Truthful Information
نویسنده
چکیده
There are many scenarios where we would like agents to report their observations or expertise in a truthful way. Game-theoretic principles can be used to provide incentives to do so. I survey several approaches to eliciting truthful information, in particular scoring rules, peer prediction methods and opinion polls, and discuss possible applications.
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تاریخ انتشار 2011