Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof -- full version
نویسنده
چکیده
We examine the characterization of the Shapley value that was introduced by Young and refined later by Neyman. A new proof of this axioma-tization is given and as an illustration of the new proof it is demonstrated that the axioms under consideration characterize the Shapley value on various well-known classes of T U games.
منابع مشابه
Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof
We consider Young (1985)'s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.
متن کاملStrong Addition Invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
This paper shows a new axiomatization of the Shapley value by using two axioms. First axiom is Dummy Player Property and second axiom is Strong Addition Invariance. Strong Addition Invariance states that the payoff vector of a game does not change even if we add some specific games to the game. By slightly changing the definition of Strong Addition Invariance, we can also axiomatize the weighte...
متن کاملAn axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
This paper is a revised version of TI-discussion paper 8-95-249, \ An axiomatization of the Shapley value using component eeciency and fairness". I would like to thank Gerard van der Laan and Eric van Damme for useful remarks on a previous draft of this paper. Financial support from the Netherlands organization for scientiic research (NWO) ESR-grant 510-01-0504 is gratefully acknowledged. Abstr...
متن کاملMatrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory
Hamiache’s recent axiomatization of the well-known Shapley value for TU games states that the Shapley value is the unique solution verifying the following three axioms: the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important...
متن کاملA concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes
The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/0805.2797 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008