Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine the efficiency and expected revenue properties of an asymmetric discriminatory auction with two bidders and two objects. While inherently inefficient, the discriminatory auction may result in higher expected revenue than the efficient Vickrey mechanism. JEL Classification: D44.
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