Dynamic Spectrum Negotiation with Asymmetric Information: Technical Report

Spectrum scarcity is becoming a serious issue due to the rapid development of wireless communication technology. Dynamic spectrum sharing can effectively improve the spectrum usage by allowing secondary unlicensed users (SUs) to dynamically and opportunistically share the spectrum with primary licensed users (PUs). In this paper, we investigate a spectrum negotiation mechanism under incomplete information in a dynamic environment, where both PU and SU can obtain rate increases through cooperative communications. Specifically, SUs relay traffics for PUs in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs’ own communication needs. We model and analyze the bargaining process as dynamic Bayesian games. We obtain several interesting Perfect Bayesian Equilibria under different system model parameters. Analysis and numerical results indicate that both PU and SU obtain performance improvements compared with no cooperation, and thus achieve a win-win situation via the spectrum negotiation.