A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification

A New Method of the Single Transferable Vote and its Axiomatic Justification

We propose a new method of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and give a unified way to describe classic procedures (Gregory Method, Inclusive Gregory Method and Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method) as an iterative procedure. A modification for quota definition is proposed which improves theoretical properties of the procedures. The method is justified by a new set of axioms. It is shown that thi...

The Axiomatic Justification of the Transferable Belief Model

Belief functions have recently been advocated as an alternative to probability functions for representing quantified belief. This new normative model has several merits, but these merits are not sufficient to justify its use. Some ‘axiomatic’ justification is also needed. Indeed the examination of the requirements that underlie the normative models of subjective behaviors provides usually the b...

Fuzzy transferable-utility games: a weighted allocation and related results

By considering the supreme-utilities among fuzzy sets and the weights among participants simultaneously, we introduce the supreme-weighted value on fuzzy transferable-utility games. Further, we provide some equivalent relations to characterize the family of all solutions that admit a potential on weights. We also propose the dividend approach to provide alternative viewpoint for the potential a...

Single Transferable Vote with Borda Elimination: A New Vote Counting System

On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules

Runoff voting rules such as single transferable vote (STV) and Baldwin’s rule are of particular interest in computational social choice due to their recursive nature and hardness of manipulation, as well as in (human) practice because they are relatively easy to understand. However, they are not known for their compliance with desirable axiomatic properties, which we attempt to rectify here. We...