Regulated Open Access Fishery

A common strategy for limiting the total annual catch in a fishery is to restrict entry and season length. We examine the results of this strategy when entry limitation amounts to a limit on capital, but fishing firms can vary an unrestricted input, and thereby use the restricted input more intensively. Under these regulatory constraints, fishing firms will earn rents that depend on the elasticity of substitution between restricted and unrestricted inputs. Using simulations with data from the Alaskan pollock fishery, rents and season length are shown to depend on fish and variable input prices, sometimes in surprisingly non monotonic ways. Acknowledgements: This work, like much of our work, is shaped by the notions and diligence of our creative colleagues in resource economics so well personified by Tom Crocker. We also thank our discussant, Chuck Mason, and other participants at the University of Wyoming’s Crockerfest for helpful comments, and Jay Shogren for organizing the Crockerfest, and who, as Tom’s former graduate student, has carried on Tom’s economic prowess and fondness for Hank Williams. JEL classifications: Q22, Q28, Q57