Fire, Fire, Kill: Changes in Terror Leadership

Personnel management at the top of terrorist groups presents a puzzle. Sub-commanders act off message reasonably often, angering powerful backers. When this happens terrorist group leaders have every incentive—and typically the means—to kill the offending subcommander. Yet we often observe group leaders firing sub-commanders instead, despite the fact that doing so allows the sub-commanders an opportunity to provide aid to the government or start up a competing group. Why? Through a pair of simple, nested formal models we illustrate the trade-offs that lead to the decision to fire, kill, or do nothing, and specify the conditions under which firing will be observed. In particular, we highlight the important role community support plays in the group leader’s decisions. We tie all the conditions we find to substantive considerations, use case studies to illuminate the mechanisms we highlight, and offer several policy implications of the model. ∗Senior Analyst, SITE Intelligence Group; E-mail: [email protected] †Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University; E-mail: [email protected]. In July of 2013, a leaflet circulated through the tribal areas of Pakistan announcing that the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) insurgent organization had dismissed their spokesman, Sajjad Momand. The leaflet accused Momand of jeopardizing the relationship between the Pakistani terrorist organization and one of their major backers, the Afghan Taliban. News of the incident was picked up by local and international media outlets, generating substantial commentary about whether it signaled instability in the alliance between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, and what impact a rupture would have on the TTP’s bloody 6-year-long insurgency against the Pakistani state. Relatively little attention focused on one of the most intriguing elements of the story: that it happened at all. The TTP’s decision to dismiss Momand, who uses the nome de guerre Ehsanullah Ehsan, is puzzling because, as the main spokesman for the group, Momand likely had access to information about the TTP’s operations as well as the means to reach internationally-wanted terrorists associated with the TTP. He was regularly featured in official propaganda videos alongside then-leader Hakimullah Mehsud, suggesting direct contact with TTP leadership. This access had value before Mehsud’s November 2013 death: in 2010, the United States State Department announced a multi-million dollar bounty for “information leading to the location of [Hakimullah] Mehsud” (Rewards For Justice Program, 2010). Alternately, rather than relieving him of his duties, the TTP could have simply killed Momand. In their years of operation, the group has demonstrated that they are willing to sow carnage, attacking not only military and civilian targets throughout Pakistan, but also individuals who threaten their operations. Online video sharing sites host graphic 1 See, for example, Umar Studio, “Emir Hakimullah Mehsud and Maulvi Wali ur-Rahman, may Allah Preserve Them, in a Special Interview.” Trans. SITE Intelligence Group. Distributed online on January 6, 2013. Available at ent.siteintelgroup.com. In the video, TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud addresses a question from the interviewer asking the group to respond to accusations that Momand is a foreign intelligence agent. In response, Mehsud invited Momand to appear before the camera and demonstrate that he was also in the room during the interview, holding this up as evidence that the claim was spurious. The Rewards for Justice Program even has an online form through which informants can submit tips anonymously, thus rendering defection not only a handsomely-rewarded alternative to participation in the TTPs’ insurgency, but also a course of action that could be initiated with a few mouse clicks.