Econ 618: Correlated Equilibrium
نویسنده
چکیده
MSNE assumes players use a random device privately and independently, that tells them which strategy to choose for any given play. The Bayesian environment, we have discussed so far assumes that signals are random, private and independent. The question that we address here is what happens if the signals are random but public (not private) and not independent across the agents and further, the agents decide their action based on these signals. The specific issue we are interested in here is, can the agents do better than their MSNE payoffs.
منابع مشابه
Econ 618: Topic 5 Correlated Equilibrium, Relationship to the set of MSNE
MSNE assumes players use a random device privately and independently, that tells them which strategy to choose for any given play. The Bayesian environment, we have discussed so far assumes that signals are random, private and independent. The question that we address here is what happens if the signals are random but public (not private) and not independent across the agents and further, the a...
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