Modeling eBay-like reputation systems: Analysis, characterization and insurance mechanism design
نویسندگان
چکیده
E-commerce systems like eBay are becoming increasingly popular. Having an effective reputation system is critical because it can assist buyers to evaluate the trustworthiness of sellers, and improve the revenue for reputable sellers and E-commerce operators. We formulate a stochastic model to analyze an eBay-like reputation system and propose four measures to quantify its effectiveness: (1) new seller ramp up time, (2) new seller drop out probability, (3) long termprofit gains for sellers, and (4) average per seller transaction gains for E-commerce operators. By analyzing a dataset from eBay, we discover that eBay suffers a long ramp up time, low long term profit gains and low average per seller transaction gains. We design a novel insurance mechanism consisting of an insurance protocol and a transactionmechanism to improve the above fourmeasures.We formulate an optimization framework to select appropriate parameters for our insurance mechanism. We conduct experiments on an eBay’s dataset and show that our insurancemechanism reduces rampup time by 91%, improves both the long termprofit gains and the average per seller transaction gains by 26.66%. It also guarantees that new sellers drop out with a small probability (close to 0). © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
Mathematical Modeling of Insurance Mechanisms for E-commerce Systems
Electronic commerce (a.k.a. E-commerce) systems such as eBay and Taobao of Alibaba are becoming increasingly popular. Having an effective reputation system is critical to this type of internet service because it can assist buyers to evaluate the trustworthiness of sellers, and it can also improve the revenue for reputable sellers and E-commerce operators. We formulate a stochastic model to anal...
متن کاملExperimental Evaluation of an eBay-Style Self-reporting Reputation Mechanism
We experimentally studied the effects of a eBay-style selfreporting reputation mechanism in an double-sided exchange economy in which participants have the option of not fulfilling their contracts. We found that submitted reports quite accurately reflected their transactions and this mechanism maintaining a high contract fulfillment rate. The inaccurate reports, which were about 5% of the total...
متن کاملHow Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?
Reputation mechanisms have become an important component of electronic markets, helping to build trust and elicit cooperation among loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic agents. Understanding the impact of different reputation mechanism design parameters on the resulting market efficiency has, thus, emerged as a question of theoretical and practical interest. Along these lines...
متن کاملAn Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets∗
Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and a buyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthiness and trust in markets with moral hazard problems. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedback determine the gains from trade that can be obtained in equilibrium. Buyer insurance, o...
متن کاملService Process Modeling through Simulation and Scenario Development for Insurance Analysis
Insurance companies are among the service organizations, which maintain close relationships with their clients by providing insurance services. Clients are the most important resource for service companies. And profitability of insurance companies undoubtedly hinges on clear analysis of client satisfaction and improved productivity of service providers. An important factor of client satisfactio...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Perform. Eval.
دوره 91 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015