Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation
نویسنده
چکیده
I study managers' risk-taking behavior and how it is affected by equity-based compensation. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 5%. I also find that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives. In particular, firms with low CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility experience more than 10% reduction in risk. Further, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift with greater incentives for risk-taking. JEL Classification: G32, G34, J33, J41
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