Cryptographic protocols Formal and Computational Proofs
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Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
Protocol security analysis has become an active research topic in recent years. Researchers have been trying to build sufficient theories for building automated tools, which give security proofs for cryptographic protocols. There are two approaches for analysing protocols: formal and computational. The former, often called Dolev-Yao style, uses abstract terms to model cryptographic messages wit...
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تاریخ انتشار 2009