Cluster points of conditioned equilibria of a class of Bayesian games as Poisson equilibria ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
In many game theoretic contexts, population uncertainty is of economic interest. In particular, games in which the number of players have Poisson distribution are of such interest. This paper shows that the cluster points of properly conditioned equilibrium profiles of certain semi-anonymous congestion games with fixed numbers of players are exactly the equilibria of corresponding Poisson games. In so doing, it contributes to the understanding of Poisson games and their relations with games in which the set of players is common knowledge.
منابع مشابه
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
We study the e ects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We de ne the set of strong sequential communication equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE di ers from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) d...
متن کاملBayesian Games with Intentions
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games [5], and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a s...
متن کاملPhase Equilibria of the Ternary System Water + Phosphoric Acid + 1-Nonanol at Different Temperatures
The purpose of this reaserch is to measure the phase equilibrium data of the ternary system (water + phosphoric acid + 1-nonanol) at different temperatures. Experimental solubility curves and tie-line points for the system were obtained at T = 298.2, 308.2 and 318.2 K and ambient pressure. The binodal curve data were detected by the cloud point method. The mass fractions of each layer ...
متن کاملLearning to Play Equilibria: The Bayesian, Repeated Games Approach∗
This is a survey of the last 15 years or so of research into an important class of models of how players might come to play equilibria in games: Bayesian models of learning in repeated strategic form games. There have been two main objectives for this research. One has been to tell stories for how equilibrium might arise, with the ultimate aim of developing a predictive theory. The other has be...
متن کاملRobustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008