Computational Learning Theory Spring Semester , 2003 / 4 Lecture 2 : March 9

نویسندگان

  • Yishay Mansour
  • Noa Bar-Yosef
  • Eitan Yaffe
چکیده

• Assume there is a network of parallel lines from an origin to a destination as shown in figure 2.1. Several agents want to send a particular amount of traffic along a path from the source to the destination. The more traffic on a particular line, the longer the traffic delay. • Allocation jobs to machines as shown in figure 2.2. Each job has a different size and each machine has a different speed. The performance of each machine reduces as more jobs are allocated to it. An example for a global optimum function, in this case, would be to minimize the load on the most loaded machine.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004