Iterated elimination of dominated strategies in countable-strategy games [working title]
نویسنده
چکیده
For an arbitrary countable ordinal α, we construct a game in which weak and strong domination coincide, and in which α rounds of elimination of dominated strategies are required to solve a game.
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