Emotions , Ideology and Collective Political Action *

r e s u M e n Después de superado el prejuicio que equiparaba emoción con irracionalidad, las teorías de la acción colectiva empiezan a incorporar las variables emocionales. Sin embargo, las emociones a las que aluden se limitan a las negativas y, fundamentalmente, a la ira. Esto obedece a que la acción colectiva se asocia exclusivamente con la protesta. Pero las acciones colectivas también pueden ser proactivas. Por este motivo, en esta investigación nos propusimos un doble objetivo: a) analizar la organización de diferentes emociones en relación a la decisión del Gobierno de España de negociar con ETA y b) conocer la incidencia de esas emociones y de la ideología, en la intención de participar en acciones de apoyo o protesta a dicha decisión. Los resultados muestran que las emociones se organizan en tres factores: ira, entusiasmo y ansiedad. La ira y el entusiasmo explican un porcentaje muy elevado de la varianza de la intención de movilizarse. La ideología, aunque en menor medida, también muestra un peso significativo. Palabras clave autores Acción colectiva, emociones, ETA, ideología. Palabras clave descriptores ETA (Organización), ideologías políticas, aspectos psicológicos, participación comunitaria. Para citar este artículo. Sabucedo, J. M., Durán, M., Alzate, M., & Barreto, I. (2011). Emotions, ideology and collective political action. Universitas Psychologica, 10(1), 27-34. * Este artículo es resultado de una investigación financiada por el Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia de España Ref. SEJ2005-02302/PSIC ** Departamento de Psicología Social, Básica y Metodología. Facultad de Psicología. 15782, Santiago de Compostela, España. Teléfono: 981563100 ext. 13789. E-mails: [email protected]; mar. [email protected]; [email protected] *** Carrera 9 Bis N° 62-43. Bogotá, Colombia. E-mail: [email protected] 0UP10-1_final.indb 27 6/8/11 6:24 AM Jose Manuel sabucedo, Mar durán, Mónica alzate, idaly barreto 28 Un i v e r s i ta s Ps yc h o l o g i ca v. 10 no. 1 e n e r o-a B r i l 2011 The motives which lead citizens to become involved in collective political actions have long interested social scientists. Le Bon’s study (1986) on the masses significantly influenced the manner of approaching this topic. In this work, the French author alluded to irritability, the exaggeration of sentiments and the inability to reason as elements that are responsible for collective behaviour. Until approximately the end of the 1960s, studies on collective behaviour proposed frustration, anger or alienation as the only explanatory variables for this type of behaviour. To a great extent, these approaches adopted the prejudice originating in the Greek period, which considered that emotion interferes with rationality (Izard, 1972; Marcus, Neuman & Mackuen, 2000). Thus, and given that collective behaviour would be determined by these emotions and passions, it could only be concluded that this was a case of maladjusted behaviour (Goodwin, Jasper & Poletta, 2000). For this reason, those authors who defended the rationality of this behaviour proposed models which avoided emotional variables, a clear example of this being the resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973). Along with these formulations, in recent years other factors with more cultural significance have been incorporated, such as that of identity (Melucci, 1996; Simon, 2004). These new theories are interesting enough; nonetheless, it cannot continue to be ignored that emotions pervade all settings of social life, including collective actions. In line with the reasoning of Lazarus (1984), emotions are reactions to cognitive evaluations of an individual’s environment. Thus, we need to analyse what impact these emotions have on the responses given by subjects when faced with different specific contexts. In the case of the relationship between emotions and collective behaviour, this analysis takes on even greater relevance, due fundamentally to three reasons. Firstly, because this is a topic that has long been ignored. Secondly, as the theory that equated emotion and irrationality is no longer supported (Marcus et al., 2000). Jasper (1998) focused this debate particularly well, pointing out that emotions, in the same way as beliefs, can be adapted or not to a given situation, but it is a serious error to consider them generically as irrational (p. 398). Thirdly, as emotions are clearly linked with action tendencies (Briñol, Gandarillas, Horcajo & Becerra, 2010; Frijda, 1988; Taylor, 1995) If the interest in studying the relationship between emotions and collective behaviour is assumed, the next step is to verify which emotions may be relevant for this objective, and how they are related to collective behaviour. The study by Goodwin et al. (2000) provides an extensive list of those emotions which, at different moments in time, have been associated to different types of collective actions and social movements: anger, pride, blame, loyalty, etc. But among them, there are some which appear to be systematically linked to collective behaviour. Anger is one of the most significant, and is among those which have elicited most interest from researchers in this area. The importance attached to this emotion is clearly highlighted in that for Gamson (1992) it is anger “... that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (p. 33). Zomeren, Spears, Fischer and Leach (2004) recently proposed a dual action tendency model, comprising instrumentality and anger, and the results of their work show that anger, resulting from the perception of injustice for the endogroup, has a direct bearing on participation in protest actions. From the perspective of violent political conflict, Bar-Tal, Halperin and De Rivera (2007) identified three emotions which contribute to the generation and maintenance of inter-group confrontation: anger, fear and hate. For the analysis of collective action, the first two emotions are of interest, since hate is more associated with irresolvable conflicts which entail the dehumanisation of the adversary (Borja-Orozco, Barreto, Sabucedo & López-López, 2008; Staub, 2005). In relation to anger, we have already pointed out that it has long been recognised as a facilitating variable in political protest. With regard to fear, and even though it may be a necessary state in the path towards hate (Halperin, 2008), under other circumstances it can also lead to inhibition when associated with anxiety (Lau & Heldman, 2009). 0UP10-1_final.indb 28 6/8/11 6:24 AM Emotions, idEology and CollECtivE PolitiCal aCtion Un i v e r s i ta s Ps yc h o l o g i ca v. 10 no. 1 e n e r o-a B r i l 2011 29 As can be observed, the two emotions that are referred to in order to explain collective action, anger and fear, are both negative. This responds to the fact that the majority of these behaviours are expressions of rejection to determined governmental policies. But this being so, it is also true that at certain moments, and in certain contexts, there may indeed be collective actions supporting decisions taken by the powers that be, and which are vehemently protested by the opposing political sectors. Thus, in situations which are highly polarised, we may find that demonstrations respond to both the rejection and support of determined policies. In the latter case, the emotion that leads to collective action cannot be negative; rather it must be positive, given that it arises from a favourable evaluation of the government’s action. In line with the above, the emotional intelligence theory by Marcus et al. (2000) may be useful for a more global consideration of the role of emotions in collective action. From this theory, we are interested in the association it establishes between different types of political settings and different emotions. These emotions, in turn, would explain various political behaviours. More specifically, said theory identifies three possible socio-political settings which people may face. Two of these are familiar, in the sense that they are encountered in the presence of well known ideas and situations and, thus, they know how to act. One would be formed by all those stimuli and decisions that individuals find positive; while the other would include actions which are perceived as negative. Finally, the third environment would include all that which is new. Thus, in this final case there are no routines or habits available to confront these unknown situations and, consequently, there would be more doubts and uncertainty regarding how to act. These settings would be associated to three emotional factors: enthusiasm, anger and anxiety, respectively. These emotions are especially present in political life when events of great impact for the interests or values of the citizens occur. One example of this is the decision to embark on a peace process with a terrorist group. Considering the characteristics of the terrorist groups (Rodríguez-Carballeira, Martín-Peña, Almendros, Escartín, Porrúa & Bertacco, 2009), such a measure may give rise to great social polarisation, due to the hopes that one part of the population may place in this process, due to the frustration of those who may perceive it as a betrayal by the government, and due to the uncertainty of those who find themselves in a setting that they had never imagined and which appears to be full of unknown factors (Sacipa, 2005; Sabucedo & Alzate, 2005). Given that, as mentioned above, these emotions are the response to the evaluation of certain political measures and decisions, there must clearly be a relationship between them and the political orientation of individuals. In the case of embarking on a peace process with a terrorist group, the stronger or weaker identification with the ideology held by the Government for this measure must be an element which contributes to demonstrating in favour of or against this decision. At the same time, it could be envisaged that the more interest one has in the matter, the firmer one’s position will be, in one sense or the other. The present work analyses these matters with regard to the Spanish Government’s decision to negotiate with ETA. On 26 March 2006, ETA (Euskadi ta Askalausa na-Pais vasco y libertad) announced a permanent ceasefire, and a few days later the Spanish Government expressed its desire to open negotiations with the terrorist group and embark on what it referred to as a peace process, which gave rise to considerable social debate and confrontation. With regard to said situation, the objectives are twofold: 1. Verifying the structure of emotions with regard to the decision by the Spanish Government to negotiate with ETA. 2. Verifying the importance of the different emotions and ideological variables in the intention to participate in demonstrations in favour of or against said decision. 0UP10-1_final.indb 29 6/8/11 6:24 AM Jose Manuel sabucedo, Mar durán, Mónica alzate, idaly barreto 30 Un i v e r s i ta s Ps yc h o l o g i ca v. 10 no. 1 e n e r o-a B r i l 2011 Method