On Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Scheduling (Addendum)
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that the only social choice functions that are implementable in a multi-unit auctions setting with two bidders which always allocate all items are affine maximizers.
منابع مشابه
Extending Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms from Subdomains to Domains
The already extended literature in Combinatorial Auctions, Public Projects and Scheduling demands a more systematic classification of the domains and a clear comparison of the results known. Connecting characterization results for different settings and providing a characterization proof using another characterization result as a black box without having to repeat a tediously similar proof is n...
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تاریخ انتشار 2008