Robert Nozick , “ Knowledge ”
نویسنده
چکیده
We would like each condition to be necessary for knowledge, so any case that fails to satisfy it will not be an instance of knowledge. Furthermore, we would like the conditions to be jointly sufficient for knowledge, so any case that satisfies all of them will be an instance of knowledge. We first shall formulate conditions that seem to handle ordinary cases correctly, classifying as knowledge cases which are knowledge, and as nonknowledge cases which are not; then we shall check to see how these conditions handle some difficult cases discussed in the literature. The causal condition on knowledge, previously mentioned, provides an inhospitable environment for mathematical and ethical knowledge; also there are well-known difficulties in specifying the type of causal connection. If someone floating in a tank oblivious to everything around him is given (by direct electrical and chemical stimulation of the brain) the belief that he is floating in a tank with his brain being stimulated, then even though that fact is part of the cause of his belief, still he does not know that it is true. Let us consider a different third condition:
منابع مشابه
Tracking , Reliabilism , and Possible Worlds
Robert Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge is defended against Colin McGinn’s criticisms by drawing on David Deutsch’s ’multiverse’ conception of possible worlds. Knowledge on the tracking account requires a ’method’ or ’way’ of believing. Exploiting this feature undercuts the apparent force of McGinn’s counter-examples. This essay focuses on Colin McGinn’s critique in Knowledge and Reality ...
متن کاملTwo Kinds of Consequentialism
In a famous footnote in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick wonders whether " a side-constraint view can be put in the form of the goal-without-side-constraint view " (Nozick 1974, 29). Put in more familiar terms, Nozick wants to know whether it is possible to represent side-constraints in a broadly consequentialist framework. For those who think that the arguments in favour of some sort ...
متن کاملHow Is Epistemic Reasoning Possible?
a SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7– 20, 2009 HOW IS EPISTEMIC REASONING POSSIBLE?
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005