How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
There were enormous di*erences in the revenues from the European “third generation” (3G, or “UMTS”) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licenses sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between 4rms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark. c © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classi cation: D44; L96
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تاریخ انتشار 2002